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ABSTRACT 
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In this thesis, I argue that tourists’ reactions to terrorism depend on how much terrorism 
they are exposed to in their home countries. I propose that if a country is more likely to 
suffer from terrorist threats, then its citizens will be more likely to ignore terrorism risk in 
their potential destinations, and they will not change their travel plans. To test this 
prediction, I conduct linear regression analysis on how tourist arrivals change according to 
different characteristics of 168 destination and 178 origin countries between 1995 and 
2014. I provide support for my hypothesis by showing that if terrorism in both destination 
and origin countries together increase, the negative effect of terrorism on tourism decreases. 
Furthermore, I find that tourists from richer countries are more sensitive to terrorist attacks 
and terrorism creates more damage for tourism sector when it is surrounded by civil war. 
The main insight of this research is that tourists of different nationalities are not 
homogenous in terms of their reactions to terrorism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv
ÖZET 
 
TURİSTLERİN TERÖRİZME KARŞI TEPKİLERİNİN HETEROJENLİĞİ 
 
 
ÇİĞDEM ÜNAL 
 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2017 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Kerim Can Kavaklı 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Terörizm, turizm sektörü, siyasal şiddet, siyasal iktisat, iç savaş. 
 
Bu tezde, turistlerin terörizme karşı tepkilerinin kendi ülkelerinde ne kadar teröre maruz 
kaldıklarına bağlı olduğu savunulmaktadır. Eğer bir ülke terör tehditinden zarar 
görmekteyse o ülke vatandaşlarının gittikleri yerlerde terör riskini göz ardı edecekleri ve 
seyehat planlarını değiştirmeyecekleri ileri sürülmektedir. Bu tahmini test etmek için, 1995 
ile 2014 yılları arasında turistlerin gittikleri 168 ve geldikleri 178 ülkenin farklı 
özelliklerine göre turist sayılarının nasıl değiştiği üzerine doğrusal regresyon analizi 
yapılmıştır. Terörizmin turistlerin hem seyehat ettikleri ülkede hem de kendi ülkelerinde 
aynı anda artmasının turizm sektöründeki olumsuz etkiyi azalttığı gösterilerek bu hipotez 
desteklenmiştir. Buna ek olarak, daha zengin ülkelerden gelen turistlerin terör saldırılarına 
karşı daha fazla hassasiyet gösterdikleri ve bir ülkede terörizmle beraber iç savaş da 
olmasının turizm sektörü için daha fazla hasara neden olduğu bulunmuştur. Bu tezin temel 
anlayışı farklı milliyetlere sahip turistlerin teröre karşı gösterdikleri tepki açısından 
homojen olmadıklarıdır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Tourism sector is highly sensitive to extreme political events such as outbreak of war, 
terrorist attacks, and civil disobedience because tourists mostly seek for relaxation, 
comfort, and fun although some tourists might be keen on adventurous activities. 
Therefore, political violence damages tourism industry. For example, the 11 September 
2001 terrorist attack led to sharp decline in the number of international tourist arrivals in 
the US, and American tourism sector could not bounce back to the pre-2001 level until 
2007 (Korstanje & Clayton, 2012). Political conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa 
region in 2011 also reduced the international tourism volume of the region (Saha & Yap, 
2013). In some cases, tourists become direct victims of terrorism. Recently, European 
countries experienced several terrorist attacks which left many casualties from around the 
world. A concert hall, a stadium, restaurants and bars in Paris were simultaneously attacked 
by suicide bombers in 20151. In 2016, Brussel’s international airport and metro station were 
targeted by coordinated bombings.2 Last but not the least, in the first hours of 2017, mass 
shootings took place in one of the most popular night clubs of Istanbul while both 
foreigners and locals were celebrating the New Year’s Eve3.  
Potential tourists hesitate to travel to conflict regions even when tourists are not 
directly targeted in previous acts of violence in those destinations (Sönmez & Graefe, 
                                                          
1 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994  
2 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35869985  
3 http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/01/europe/turkey-nightclub-attack/index.html  
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1998). However, some countries’ tourism sector stays resilient even after terrorist attacks, 
and tourists continue to visit those terrorism-affected destinations (Korstanje & Clayton, 
2012). As countries’ vulnerability to terrorism differs, reactions of tourists from different 
countries to terrorism differ as well (Fielding & Shortland, 2008, 2011; Reisinger & 
Mavondo, 2006; Tremblay, 1989). 
Which characteristics of countries do make their citizens more sensitive to forms of 
political violence compared to others? Previous research has revealed that tourists from 
countries with lower levels of economic development and higher crime rates are less likely 
to cancel their travel plans to violent destinations (Fielding & Shortland, 2008). In addition 
to these socio-economic factors, motivations behind the travel plan also affects the 
likelihood of hesitating to visit risky destinations. Tourists who choose a specific 
destination for its cultural attractions are less likely to deter from their decisions than 
tourists who are in search of snow-capped mountains or sunny beaches (Neumayer, 2004). 
Moreover, media coverage is effective in manipulating tourists’ decision-making process 
(Korstanje & Clayton, 2012). The extent of terrorism-related media reports might have an 
impact on potential tourists’ perceptions of specific destinations. Lastly, being accustomed 
to the presence of armed security forces on streets and lax gun laws make individuals less 
risk averse (Fielding & Shortland, 2008, 2011). In a nutshell, a high level of exposure to 
violence, or the threat of violence, leads to a reduced response to violence. 
In this thesis, I argue that reactions of tourists to terrorism vary depending on their 
levels of exposure to terrorist attacks in their home countries. Based on this insight, I 
propose that if a country is more likely to suffer from terrorist threats, then its citizens will 
be more likely to ignore terrorism risk of their potential destinations, and they will not 
change or cancel their travel plans. I also investigate, when they are analyzed together, 
which other factors can change the negative effect of terrorism such as economic growth, 
the uniqueness of a destination, and the intensity level of civil war. Previous studies on the 
reactions of tourists of different nationalities towards terrorism do not go beyond 
comparing American and European tourists or studying with specific cases rather than 
cross-country sample. In this thesis, to test my hypotheses, I conduct a series of analysis on 
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how tourist arrivals change according to different characteristics of 168 destination and 178 
origin countries between 1995 and 2014. 
My main finding is that, consistent with the previous literature, terrorism in a 
destination country negatively affects inbound tourist flows. Moreover, I present some 
evidence which shows that being exposed to terrorism in an origin country decreases 
potential tourists’ sensitivity to terrorism. Surprisingly, I find that the terrorist incidents that 
happened one or two years ago in a destination country do not have a negative effect on 
contemporary tourist arrivals. Furthermore, I find that tourists from richer countries are 
more sensitive to terrorist attacks and terrorism creates more damage for tourism sector 
when it is surrounded by civil wars.  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The next section presents a brief 
review of the relevant literature and positionality of this thesis within it. Thereafter, I 
outline my theoretical argumentation and my key predictions. Chapter four describes the 
data sources, measurements, and my statistical model. The subsequent chapter introduces 
the main results of my analysis. The final chapter discusses some implications for further 
studies and concludes. 
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PREVIOUS LITERATURE ON TERRORISM 
 
 
 
This thesis contributes to the literature on the aftermath of terrorism and the literature 
on the political economy of conflict by standing at the intersection of these two fields. 
Terrorism is defined as the deliberate use or threat to use violence by a subnational or 
a non-state entity with the purpose of challenging the political authority (Hoffman, 2006; 
Ruby, 2002b; Sandler & Enders, 2008). Terrorists intend to create as many casualties as 
possible to threaten the stability and peace and to evoke a state of fear, anger and despair 
among society beyond their immediate victims (Arce & Sandler, 2005; Fiala, 2002; 
Hoffman, 2006; Korstanje & Clayton, 2012; Kydd & Walter, 2006; Sandler, 2014; Sandler 
& Lapan, 1988). Although various definitions of terrorism exist in the literature, the 
definition above is important in several ways. First, governments’ any act of violence is 
excluded from the scope of this definition because it emphasizes that terrorist attacks need 
to be carried out by sub-national or non-state groups. Secondly, the definition requires that 
an attack must have political objectives to be labeled as a terrorist incident. Lastly, although 
terrorists’ ultimate target is a political authority, they victimize and terrorize a wider 
population. 
In the literature, scholars have underlined various factors which motivate individuals 
to carry out acts of terrorism. Psychological approach focuses on personal characteristics 
which lead individuals to take part in terrorist activities. Early studies in line with this 
approach treat terrorists as mentally ill individuals (Kaplan, 1981; Post, 1984, 1990; Ruby, 
2002a; Victoroff, 2005). These studies are based on individual levels of analysis and they 
are far from providing comprehensive explanations for political, ideological, economic, and 
social motivations behind terrorist acts. 
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Rational choice theory proposes that individuals take their decisions based on the 
assessment of expected benefits and costs of each action and they seek to maximize their 
utility (Verba, 1961). Rational explanations of terrorism assume that terrorists are well-
functioning people rather than deranged or fanatic people who use violence for the sake of 
violence (Crenshaw, 1981; Sandler & Enders, 2004; Sandler & Lapan, 1988; Wilson, 
2000). Therefore, terrorist acts are rooted from calculated and conscious decisions among 
non-violent and violent options. 
The goal of terrorist attacks is crucial for every terrorism study because the success of 
any terrorist activity or organization is defined according to their initial goal. Based on 
rational calculation, by considering potential costs, terrorists resort to violence to achieve 
social or political benefits. Terrorists might aim at various ends but it is useful to categorize 
their objectives as short term and long term objectives (Neumayer & Plümper, 2016). 
Terrorists intend to reach political ends such as regime change, territorial change, policy 
change, social control, or status quo maintenance in the long run (Kydd & Walter, 2006) 
but they rarely reach their ultimate goals (Abrahms, 2008; Neumayer & Plümper, 2016). 
Even when they are aware of the fact that the government will not concede their demands 
easily, terrorists keep operating to reach their main short term objectives: to increase their 
power by recruiting new terrorists, training their members, gaining financial support, and 
attracting media attention and to decrease their opponents’ power by killing or taking 
hostage well-known representatives from the government or the military, damaging 
infrastructural investments, and reducing the ﬁnancial capabilities of the government 
(Neumayer & Plümper, 2016). These short term objectives are essential for the survival of 
organization and to keep its supporters loyal while deterring its rivals. 
Moreover, terrorists keep operating although the chance of reaching their ultimate 
goals is low, because terrorist attacks provide them an environment to disseminate their 
ideologies, political messages and demands among wider audience (Arce & Sandler, 2005; 
Kydd & Walter, 2006; Sandler & Lapan, 1988). By doing this, terrorists also show the 
people the inadequacy of governments to protect its citizens. In other words, terrorists use 
political violence as a tool for political communication with wider public and ultimately, 
with political authority. By terrorizing individuals, they aim to create a social and political 
6 
 
atmosphere in which they can force governments to make concessions to their demands 
(Arce & Sandler, 2005; Korstanje & Clayton, 2012). 
An extensive literature exists on the aftermath of terrorism. Terrorism creates serious 
political, social or economic consequences for both individuals and countries and these 
consequences are highly related to each other. Political consequences, for instance, are not 
independent from economic consequences. Terrorism can cause economic costs for a 
targeted country through various ways (S. Brock Blomberg, Hess, & Orphanides, 2004; 
Llorca‐Vivero, 2008). With the theory of Complex Interdependence, Keohane and Nye 
(1987) assert that in the era of interdependence, the nature of international relations has 
been changed and world has become more interdependent in all respects particularly in 
economic activities. In their theory, the existence of transnational relations and societal 
interdependence make countries more “sensitive” and “vulnerable” to one another. 
Terrorist incidents lead to economic consequences in macroeconomic level by reducing 
foreign direct investment, destroying infrastructural investments, shifting public investment 
funds to security-related areas, or decreasing the level of international trade volume 
(Sandler & Enders, 2008). Even in countries which protect their overall economic growth 
against terrorist attacks, microeconomic costs might be indispensable for some specific 
sectors such as tourism, international trade, and financial sectors (Llorca‐Vivero, 2008; 
Sandler & Enders, 2004, 2008). 
Literature on the relationship between terrorism and tourism sector is expanding 
because tourists are often targeted by terrorists. Neumayer and Plümper (2016) differentiate 
hard targets and soft targets of terrorist acts. Attacking hard targets such as government 
buildings or military officials can create greater inﬂuence on both supporters and rivals of 
the terrorist organization, because attacking them requires well-planned strategies and high 
capability. However, attacking soft targets such as tourist hotels or tourist attractions are 
possible without onerous preparation or resource. Beyond being an easy target, tourists are 
attacked by terrorists because terrorism and tourism represent two conflicting world views. 
Tourism requires freedom to travel, mobility and consumption while terrorists often 
perceive these aspects as corrupt and immoral (Korstanje & Clayton, 2012). Tourist flows 
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also lead to the interaction and exchange of foreign cultures which are not welcomed by 
terrorists.  
The study of the relationship between political violence and tourism has drawn 
attention of scholars from different disciplines such as travel scholars, economists, 
psychologists, and also political scientists. Political science focuses on the positive relation 
of tourism and peace. In the literature two groups of study exist. One group emphasizes that 
tourism plays a mediator role for peace by opening communication channels between 
countries and abating negative perceptions of tourists towards the host country by looking 
at particular cases (Anson, 1999; Chen, 2010; Cho, 2007). Contrary to those scholars who 
show tourism as a ground for peace, Litvin (1998) gives an important contribution to 
empirical studies on the link between terrorism and tourism by questioning whether a 
causal link between tourism and peace exists or not. Many studies, in line with Litvin 
(1998), have speculated that tourism is a beneficiary of peace rather than its driver, so 
scholars heavily agreed on a unidirectional relationship from terrorism to tourism (Llorca‐
Vivero, 2008; Pratt & Liu, 2016; Raza & Jawaid, 2013). 
 Previous literature has extensively covered the negative impact of terrorist activities 
on tourist flows to travel destinations suffering from political violence or terrorist incidents 
(for reviews see Voltes-Dorta et al., 2015) except Wolff and Larsen (2014) who focus on 
the 2011 Oslo/Utøya mass killings. In one of the early studies on this subject, Enders and 
Sandler (1991) find a significant negative effect of terrorism on tourism in Spain between 
1970 and 1988 by using monthly data. Moreover, Enders et al. (1992), employ a larger 
sample consisting of Western European countries for the period of 1974-1988, and show 
that tourists tend to eliminate their risk of being exposed to any terrorist attack and be 
ﬂexible in their destination choices.  
There is a group of studies which concerns differences among countries in terms of 
consequences of terrorist incidents on tourism. Saha and Yap (2013) come up with an 
interesting finding by comparing countries those have low to moderate and high level of 
political risk, and show that terrorist attacks increase tourism demand in low to moderate 
political risk countries while it has negative effect in high-risk countries. Socio-economic 
factors also affect the scope of vulnerability of countries toward terrorism. According to 
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Pratt and Liu (2015), peace is more important to tourism in medium income destinations. 
Developed countries are more likely to minimize the negative effect of terrorist attacks and 
recover their economies than developing countries (S. Brock Blomberg et al., 2004; Sandler 
& Enders, 2008; Tavares, 2004). Countries with diversified economic activities are capable 
to redistribute their resources and divert their focus from vulnerable sectors to safer sectors 
(Sandler & Enders, 2008). Moreover, Drakos and Kutan (2003) posit that tourist arrivals in 
Turkey and Israel are more sensitive to terrorism than Greece. The extent of countries’ 
vulnerability against negative economic consequences of terrorism depends not only on 
their economic structure and potential, but also their institutional structure and the level of 
democracy. The economic damage of terrorism on less democratic countries are more 
severe (Tavares, 2004). On the other hand, the level of democracy is also associated with 
the number of terrorist attacks. Some studies claim that the more democratic a country is, 
the fewer terrorist attacks it experiences (S Brock Blomberg & Rosendorff, 2006; Li, 2005; 
Rodrik, 1997) while according to Abadie (2006), if a country is in a transitional period 
between democratic and authoritarian regimes it is more vulnerable to terrorism. 
Although recent studies have accepted heterogeneity of countries regarding the extent 
they are affected from terrorist attacks, a common limitation of these studies is the fact that 
they assume international tourists as a homogeneous group in terms of their choices and 
behaviors. Moreover, most studies present country-specific analysis rather than cross-
country. It could be argued that Tremblay (1989) and Fielding and Shortland (2011) are 
among rare studies which differentiate aggregated tourist flows; they compare American 
and European tourists. Contrary to the findings of Tremblay (1989) which show that 
Americans are more sensitive to terrorism than Europeans, Fielding and Shortland (2011) 
find that American tourists showed less sensitivity to political violence in Egypt during 
1990s than their European counterparts. Tourists of different nationalities are not 
homogenous in terms of their reactions to terrorism. Fielding and Shortland (2008) examine 
cross-sectional asymmetries in terms of reactions of tourists of different nationalities to 
violence in one destination which is Israel after the outbreak of Palestinian uprising Intifada 
in 2000. Additionally, Reisinger and Mavondo (2006) gathered data from 830 participants 
with their structured questionnaire and conclude that tourists from the United States, Hong 
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Kong and Australia feel more threatened and vulnerable and hesitate more to travel than 
tourists from the United Kingdom, Canada and Greece. Because of the given limitation in 
the literature, this research will explore to what extent tourists’ attitudes toward terrorist 
incidents vary depending on their country of origin with a more comprehensive dataset. 
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THEORETICAL LINKAGE BETWEEN TERRORISM AND TOURISM 
 
 
 
Choice is characterized by conflict, uncertainty, risk, and decision-making process. In 
tourism context, travelers decide to travel to a specific destination among a set of available 
alternatives and the consequences of their travel decisions involve uncertainty. Potential 
tourists might associate perceived risk with some destinations and their decisions might 
include risky alternatives (Sönmez & Graefe, 1998). 
Tourists’ perceptions of risk and their attitudes toward risky destinations are highly 
affected by variety of external and internal factors (Baker, 2014; Sönmez & Graefe, 1998). 
The number of terrorist attacks, the level of casualty resulting from these attacks, media 
coverage about terrorist threat, the reports of government issued travel advisories, and 
recovery campaigns of government or tourism organizations influence the image of 
touristic destinations. In addition, internal factors such as individuals’ levels of risk 
aversion, levels of knowledge about different types of risk, and demographic characteristics 
including age, social status, nationality, gender, income and the level of education as well 
as their international tourism experiences are related to tourists’ travel decisions. Higher 
perceived risk and negative images about a destination might lead tourists to change or 
cancel their travel plans, or to neither return to the destination nor recommend the 
destination to other people (George, 2003). The recovery of tourism demand is only 
possible when the negative image is removed from people’s minds (Neumayer, 2004). This 
is because the typical modern tourist seeks relaxation and will try to eliminate all factors 
which could undermine their pleasure of the travel (Fielding & Shortland, 2011). 
Because of given external and internal factors, people may perceive the same risk in 
different ways. Similarly, in international tourism, tourists’ risk and safety perceptions are 
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highly related to their cultural, religious and political backgrounds so “travelers of different 
nationalities may perceive the same risk differently” (Reisinger & Mavondo, 2006:16). 
Moreover, the levels of risk aversion of tourists vary significantly across countries 
depending on whether they are exposed to terrorism in their home countries (Yaya, 2009). 
Target groups of sustained terrorist attacks in travel destination or the type of attacks 
employed by terrorists also influence the perceived terrorism risk (Baker, 2014). Fielding 
and Shortland (2011) indicate that Americans are less sensitive to political violence and 
terrorism compared to European tourists and this might be because they are exposed to 
intercommunity tension, high crime rate, and intensive media coverage of terrorism and 
gun laws more often. As a result, they become more confident about being able to avoid 
potentially dangerous situations. In the light of these arguments, I reached the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Tourists from countries which are exposed to terrorist attacks are less 
sensitive to terrorist attacks in their destination countries. 
Nevertheless, the discussion about how tourists reshape their travel choices in the 
same region revolve around two main arguments. Firstly, the argument of generalization 
effect or spill-over effect proposes that tourists generalize the risk of terrorism to the whole 
region; therefore, they hesitate to travel to any country in that region (Sönmez, 1998; 
Drakos & Kutan, 2003; Neumayer, 2004). Generalization effect is not only valid for 
countries which have geographical proximity but also for all sufficiently similar countries 
where tourists have been targeted by terrorists. Moreover, it does not have to be that only 
tourists of the same nationalities with the groups that has been targeted by terrorist attacks 
hesitate to travel but tourists who have sufficiently similar nationalities in terms of 
countries’ political regimes, ideologies or religions also hesitate to travel to terrorism 
affected destinations (Neumayer & Plümper, 2016). In other words, countries within 
conflicts region might suffer from negative externality of political violence.  
Secondly, the argument of substitutability effect claims that if any terrorist activity 
occurs in a travel destination, tourists look for a substitution of that destination with another 
one perceived as safer (Drakos & Kutan, 2003; Fielding & Shortland, 2011; Neumayer, 
2004). Some countries might have benefitted from the positive externality of political 
violence by presenting themselves as a safer destination than other alternatives in the 
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region. Being in the same geographical region does not necessarily mean being a substitute 
country; each country might have its unique attractions that are more difficult to be 
substituted. Although Neumayer (2004) indicates that even when a destination country 
hosts highly unique and popular attractions, attacks on tourists can substantially hurt a 
country’s tourism industry as Egypt experienced in the 1990s, countries’ unique cultural or 
historical attractions are also an important factor for tourists’ destination choices (Fielding 
& Shortland, 2011). Therefore, I reach my first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Tourists are less sensitive to terrorist attacks in their destination 
countries if the level of cultural, historical or natural uniqueness is high in those countries. 
The vulnerability of countries towards terrorist attacks varies based on their economic 
structures and performances as it is discussed above. There may also be a connection 
between tourists’ attitudes to risk and the level of economic development of their origin 
country because international travel requires spare time and enough financial resource for 
individuals. It might be even more expensive since travel costs change by the fluctuations 
in countries’ exchange rates (Saha & Yap, 2013). Therefore, tourists of poorer countries are 
considerably rich compared to their fellow citizens. Because of their relative wealth, they 
may have more experience of being a potential criminal target and may be familiar with 
dealing with security challenges (Fielding & Shortland, 2008). In order to test given 
argument, I expect to find support for the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Tourists from countries with lower GDP per capita are less sensitive to 
terrorist attacks in their destination countries. 
Terrorism and civil war are overlapping concepts to some extent although it is not 
possible to claim that all terrorist incidents are related to civil wars or vice versa (Findley & 
Young, 2012). They both damage tourism sector by creating uncertainity and threat of 
violence (Sönmez, 1998). The literature on political violence is mostly based on studies 
which examine one forms of violence rather than the joint effect of different political 
violence forms (Findley & Young, 2012). However, different forms of violence cause 
different levels of damage for countries’ well-being. For example, the negative effect of 
wars and coups on tourism are greater than the effect of one-off terrorist incidents (Saha & 
Yap, 2013; Spilerman & Stecklov, 2009). Also, according to the WTTC press release 
(2015), countries’ tourism sector recovers in 13 months, on average, after terrorist attacks 
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while an average recovery time after political turmoils is 26.7 months.4 Terrorist attacks 
surrounded by sustained civil wars might create worse consequences for tourism industry. 
Since the level of civil war intensity is a significant factor both for terrorism and tourism, it 
is important to examine the interaction between civil war and terrorism on tourism demand. 
Therefore, I form these two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4: Tourists are more sensitive to terrorist attacks if the level of civil war 
intensity is high in their destination countries. 
                                                          
4 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/europe/france/paris/articles/13-months-how-long-it-will-take-Paris-to-
recover/ 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I describe the operationalization and the sources of my variables. My 
unit of analysis is a dyad-year between 1995 and 2014. Each dyad consists of a destination 
country and a country of origin for tourists. Overall, my sample includes 14630 dyads made 
up of 168 destination countries and 178 countries of origin. 
My dependent variable is the annual number of tourist arrivals in a country, broken 
down by tourists’ country of origin. The data on international inbound tourists comes from the 
United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) (2015). UNWTO excludes seasonal 
and other short-term workers, and also long-term students from its Arrivals data. This 
strengthens our analysis because people who are forced to arrive in a destination because of 
their occupation or education rather than their pure pursuit of pleasure are not taken into 
account. UNWTO collects data from different sources of countries: border statisticts, border 
surveys and registration at accomodation establishments.5 Not every country measures the 
total number of inbound tourists in the same way, therefore, the dataset lacks one consistent 
measurement method for tourist arrivals for all countries. UNWTO divides the ways that 
countries provide their tourism records into 12 different categories. It is worth to note that 
UNWTO differentiates “tourists” from “visitors”. Being a “tourist” requires overnight stay in 
a destination while “same-day visitor” means excursionists. 
Table 1 explains how different types of measurement of tourist arrivals are 
operationalized, whereas Table 2 shows their frequency in the whole dataset. Throughout the 
analysis in this thesis, I used Arrival 1 to Arrival 4 as my main dependent variables because 
they include more than the half of the observations in the dataset. In addition, I believe these 4 
                                                          
5 World Tourism Organization (2015), Methodological Notes to the Tourism Statistics Database, 2015 Edition, UNWTO, 
Madrid. Retrieved from http://statistics.unwto.org/content/compendium-tourism-statistics (accessed May 26, 2017). 
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types of arrival measurement are more powerful in terms of representativeness and diversity 
of observations. Figure 1 presents how many geographical regions are included in each type 
of arrival measurement and shows that Arrival 1-4 represent not only the highest number of 
observations but also observations from the highest number of regions. I used the 
classification of regions of the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) where my data on terrorism 
is based on. GTD codes 12 different geographical regions. 
Since tourists’ destination choices are based on their perceptions of the image of 
country and their travel experiences, the volume of inbound tourism would be an outcome of 
the factors from previous years. I control for the lagged versions of my socio-economic 
explanatory variables. Most tourism activities are arranged by early booking so the lag effect 
is important when the dependent variable is tourist arrivals (Yaya, 2009). Furthermore, my 
dependent variable Tourist Arrivals is highly affected by tourism demand in the previous year 
(Garín Muñoz, 2007). It assumed that, by including the lag of dependent variable as well, the 
effect of previous year’s tourism demand on current tourist flows is captured. I also include 
Year and Region dummy variables to minimize the possible effect of some specific years and 
regions on the analysis. 
Table 1:  Operationalization of dependent variables 
Variable Operationalization  
Arrival 1 Arrivals of non-resident tourists at national borders, by nationality 
Arrival 2 Arrivals of non-resident tourists at national borders, by country of residence 
Arrival 3 Arrivals of non-resident visitors at national borders, by nationality 
Arrival 4 Arrivals of non-resident visitors at national borders, by country of residence 
Arrival 5 Arrivals of non-resident tourists in hotels and similar establishments, by nationality 
Arrival 6 Arrivals of non-resident tourists in hotels and similar establishments, by country of 
residence 
Arrival 7 Overnight stays of non-resident tourists in hotels and similar establishments, by 
nationality 
Arrival 8 Overnight stays of non-resident tourists in hotels and similar establishments, by country 
of residence 
Arrival 9 Arrivals of non-resident tourists in all types of accommodation establishments, by 
nationality 
Arrival 10 Arrivals of non-resident tourists in all types of accommodation establishments, by 
country of residence 
Arrival 11 Overnight stays of non-resident tourists in all types of accommodation establishments, 
by nationality 
Arrival 12 Overnight stays of non-resident tourists in all types of accommodation establishments, 
by country of residence 
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Table 2:  Frequency of dependent variables 
Variable Obs. Mean   Std. Dev. Min Max 
Arrival 1 50555 6.688701 3.235796 .6931472 16.97901 
Arrival 2 59656 6.873695 3.223952 .6931472 16.97901 
Arrival 3 43548 7.510087 3.1792 .6931472 17.80056 
Arrival 4 39322 7.042038 3.135012 .6931472 17.61392 
Arrival 5 10559 9.499986 2.320945 .6931472 15.78012 
Arrival 6 20088 8.881903 3.1188         .6931472 16.02034 
Arrival 7 13686 10.55435 2.416668 .6931472 17.36906 
Arrival 8 21275 9.60873 3.200435 .6931472 17.77378 
Arrival 9 8829 9.54519 2.289352       1.791759 16.16988 
Arrival 10 22365 8.267845 3.254667  .6931472 16.30042 
Arrival 11 8905 10.6433 2.415381        1.94591 17.79868 
Arrival 12 27492 9.472901 3.638098  .6931472 18.54689 
  
 
My data on terrorist attacks in destination and origin countries comes from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD conceptualizes a terrorist attack as “the threatened or 
actual use of illegal force and violence by a non‐state actor to attain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation”.6 My two main variables of 
terrorism are the annual number of terrorist attacks and the annual number of people killed 
because of terrorist attacks.  In addition, I create two additional sets of ordinal measures to 
                                                          
6 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database 
[Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd (accessed May 26, 2017). 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Arrival 1 Arrival 2 Arrival 3 Arrival 4 Arrival 5 Arrival 6 Arrival 7 Arrival 8 Arrival 9 Arrival
10
Arrival
11
Arrival
12
T
h
e 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
R
eg
io
n
s
Arrival Type
Figure 1: The number of regions included by each type of arrival
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depict the relative severity level of terrorist attacks in a given year: Target Severity and Attack 
Severity. GTD identifies 22 different categories for the type of target that terrorists attack and 
9 different categories for the method of attack that terrorists use. Following Conrad and 
Greene (2015), I collapse the nominal scale into an ordinal scale in which a value of “1” 
indicates the lowest level of severity while a value of “3” indicates the highest level of 
severity. 7 Since each country might experience multiple terrorist attacks in a year and these 
attacks might have different levels of severity, I code the highest level of severity that a state 
experienced in a given year. If a country does not experience any attack in a given year, these 
two variables are coded as “0”. 
I include a number of destination country- and country of origin-specific control 
variables that may influence the total number of tourist arrivals and the likelihood of terrorist 
attacks. I control for the level of attractiveness of a destination country to capture its 
uniqueness for potential tourists. I operationalize attractiveness of a country by coding its total 
number of both cultural and natural sites which are placed in the UNESCO’s World Heritage 
List because “world heritage in a country increases demand for travel to the destination” 
(Saha & Yap, 2013, p.6). Geographical proximity is highly related to the interaction among 
states such as trade by providing opportunities or reducing costs (Gleditsch & Ward, 2001). 
My variable on geographical proximity is based on Gleditsch and Ward’s Distance between 
Capital Cities Data. 
To account for potential economic determinants of tourism sector, political violence, 
and the dyadic flow of goods and services, I incorporate the natural log of the GDP per capita 
in constant USD and the population size of both destination and sender country in each year, 
taken from World Bank. I also control for the natural log of the real exchange rate which 
measures national currency units per US dollar that are adjusted by purchasing power parity 
(PPP) over GDP and it is obtained from Penn World (Feenstra, Inklaar, & Timmer, 2015). It 
is a proxy for tourism prices which captures the relative prices between destination country 
and country of origin (Saha and Yap, 2013, p.5). 
                                                          
7 The Target Severity variable equals ‘1’ if the attack is against telecommunications, transportation, airports, maritime 
infrastructure, food or water sources, and utilities. I code an attack as a ‘2’ if it is against police, military, government 
personnel, other terrorists or violent political parties. At the highest level of severity, ‘3,’ I include attacks against all 
civilians. All attacks listed as “Other” in the GTD data are coded as missing. Two other categories were also coded as 
missing, “religious” and “abortion,” because the categorization of these two was less straightforward. The Attack Severity 
variable equals ‘1’ if the attack is against infrastructure and unarmed assaults. Attacks are coded as ‘2’ if they involve hostage 
takings or hijackings. Final category, coded as a ‘3,’ includes armed assaults and bombings. 
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I include both destination and sender country’s overall level of democracy using the 
Polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2002) because countries with a 
higher level of political and economic freedom are expected to have a higher number of 
tourist arrivals. People whose personel freedom is violated in their origin country might seek 
for more personal freedom through travelling. On the other hand, tourists coming from 
countries which respect personal freedom are more likely to wait same attitude in the 
countries they travel (Saha, Su, & Campbell, 2016). In addition, more economic freedom 
increases the competitiveness of tourism sector in a country which might lead to higher 
quality service for tourists (Das & DiRienzo, 2008). The ordinal measure of democracy 
ranges from -10 to 10 where higher value indicates more democratic state institutions. For this 
study, dichotomous variable, Democracy, is coded as 1 if a country’s Polity2 score is higher 
than 5 and 0 otherwise. 
In order to isolate my measures of terrorism from any effect from armed civil conflicts, 
I include an Civil War Intensity variable which measures the ordinal intensity of armed 
conflict in a country based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. The variable ranges 
from 0 to 2 where “1” represents “minor conflicts” with 25 to 999 battle-related deaths and 
“2” represents “wars” with at least at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.8  
To identify dyads that includes countries which have poor relations with each other, I 
use the measure of UN General Assembly voting similarity from Voeten et al. In the given 
dataset, ideal point is the mean estimate of a country ideal point. Political Proximity variable 
represents absolute distance between two countries posterior mean ideal point estimates. 
To examine my hypotheses, this thesis uses the linear regression model and the 
interaction effect technique to determine the combined effect of terrorism in destination and 
origin countries and also the combined effect of terrorism and some socio-economic and 
political characteristics of countries. Interaction effects measure the joint effects of 
independent variables on a dependent variable rather than focusing on the effects of a single 
independent variable, and the effect of one variable is interpreted depending on the effect of 
another variable. (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991; Braumoeller, 2004; McClelland & Judd, 1993; 
Saha & Yap, 2013). While most empirical studies confirm that terrorism in a destination 
country itself reduce tourism demand, the joint effect of terrorism with some specific 
                                                          
8 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook. Version 4-2016. 
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characteristics of tourists’ origin countries are overlooked by scholars. Therefore, in this 
thesis, I examine the combined effects of terrorism with some control variables as well as 
their individual effects. 
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5 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
All models include region and year dummies and the full list of destination country- 
and country of origin-specific control variables. Standard errors are clustered at the dyad-
level. In all tables below, Models 1 through 4 include the same set of control variables, but 
the key dependent variable differs in each case (Arrival 1 through Arrival 4). Logarithmic 
transformations of my main independent (the number of terrorist attacks and terrorism-
related deaths) and dependent variables (tourist arrivals) and also socio-economic control 
variables (population, GDP per capita and cuurency exchange rate) are used to ensure that 
the variables are approximately symmetrically distributed. 
Table 3 shows the regression results that were conducted to analyze the relationships 
between the logged number of tourist arrivals in a destination country and the logged 
number of terrorist attacks in both destination and origin countries. When we consider all 4 
models, unsurprisingly, the number of terrorist attacks in a destination country is 
negatively related to the number of tourist arrivals in all statistically significant 
specifications. Coefficient for the number of terrorist attacks in an origin country is also 
negative in all models, but not consistently significant. This suggests that the number of 
terrorist attacks in tourists’ country of origin by itself does not affect the level of tourist 
arrivals in a destination country. In models which my main independent variable is the 
number of terrorist attacks, Hypothesis 1 is not supported.  
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Table 4 presents the regression results of models which my main independent 
variable is the logged number of terrorism-related killings in a given year. As expected, 
terrorism-related killings in both destination and origin countries has a negative effect on 
tourist flows in all models. Consistent with my hypothesis, the interaction between the 
number of terrorism-related killings in destination and origin countries has a positive and 
significant effect on the number of tourist arrivals in Model 1. It is important to note that 
these results are more robust if the total numbers of terrorism-related death are considered 
as a proxy to measure the effect of terrorism rather than the total numbers of terrorist 
attacks. 
My estimation results which main independent variables are attack severity and target 
severity are presented in Table 5 and 6. In all models, my estimates suggest that higher 
levels of both target and attack severities in an origin country is associated with lower level 
of tourist arrivals in a destination while severity levels do not provide consistent results. 
Similar to the results which are shown in Table 4, only in models which tourist arrival is 
calculated as the total number of non-resident tourists at national borders by their 
nationality (Arrival 1), the interaction between target severity in destination and origin 
countries and also the interaction between attack severity in destination and origin countries 
are positively and significantly related to the tourist arrivals. This provides support for 
Hypothesis 1 by showing that when the severity levels of terrorism in both destination and 
origin countries together increase, the negative effect of terrorism decreases. These findings 
are consistent for both Attack Severity and Target Severity independent variables. 
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My previous series of analysis assumes that tourist arrivals in a year are affected by 
terrorist incidents and their casualities which take place in the same year. I further test my 
hypothesis by looking at the effect of terrorist activities happened in last 2 years on current 
tourist arrivals. Table 7 shows the results which my main independent variable is the 
number of annual terrorist attacks, whereas Table 8 shows the results of the analysis which 
test the impact of the deadliness of terrorism. As it is shown on the results in Table 7 and 8, 
I find that terrorist attacks which took place in the previous year or two years ago does not 
negatively affect tourist arrivals in a current year and the direction of the relationship 
between terrorism and tourist changes compared to the model which contemporaneous 
variables are considered. While terrorism in a current year reduces tourist arrivals, incidents 
from past years encourage more tourists to visit attacked destinations. This positive effect 
conflicting with the literature might be because of the inquisitiveness of potential tourists 
(Saha & Yap, 2013). 
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Table 7: Independent Variable Lagged by 1 and 2 Years: Number of Terrorist Attacks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Arrival1 Arrival2 Arrival3 Arrival4 
Terrorist Attacks (destination) -0.0177** -0.0332** -0.0203** -0.0123* 
 (0.00545) (0.00439) (0.00459) (0.00644) 
     
L. Terrorist Attacks (destination) -0.00194 0.0243** 0.0241** 0.0205** 
 (0.00669) (0.00599) (0.00595) (0.00711) 
     
L2.Terrorist Attacks (destination) 0.0178** 0.0162** -0.00939** 0.0258** 
 (0.00520) (0.00534) (0.00468) (0.00648) 
     
Terrorist Attacks (origin) -0.0133** 0.00101 -0.00344 -0.00256 
 (0.00497) (0.00467) (0.00412) (0.00491) 
     
L.Terrorist Attacks (origin) 0.00917 0.00170 0.00332 -0.00240 
 (0.00643) (0.00614) (0.00548) (0.00665) 
     
L2.Terrorist Attacks (origin) 0.00412 -0.00551 0.000252 0.00140 
 (0.00558) (0.00494) (0.00447) (0.00536) 
     
Attacks(dest.) x Attacks (origin) 0.00294** 0.00144 0.00135 0.00192 
 (0.00144) (0.00135) (0.00155) (0.00216) 
     
L.Attacks (dest.) x L.Attacks (origin) -0.000466 -0.00106 -0.00334* -0.00340 
 (0.00194) (0.00183) (0.00193) (0.00279) 
     
L2.Attacks (dest.) x L2.Attacks (origin) -0.00207 -0.00183 0.00318** -0.00174 
 (0.00162) (0.00156) (0.00156) (0.00240) 
N 39865 46323 33328 29454 
r2 0.966 0.970 0.978 0.965 
Dyad-clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05. 
Control variables are included in analysis but omitted from tables.
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Table 8: Independent Variable Lagged by 1 and 2 Years: Deadliness of Terrorist Attacks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Arrival1 Arrival2 Arrival3 Arrival4 
Number of Killings (destination) -0.0133** -0.0177** -0.0229** -0.00367 
 (0.00344) (0.00267) (0.00297) (0.00576) 
     
L.Killings (destination) -0.00290 -0.00213 0.0177** 0.0121** 
 (0.00378) (0.00269) (0.00366) (0.00603) 
     
L2.Killings (destination) 0.0201** 0.0246** 0.00382 0.00566 
 (0.00317) (0.00279) (0.00300) (0.00555) 
     
Number of Killings (origin) -0.00715* -0.00166 -0.00177 -0.00565 
 (0.00373) (0.00312) (0.00293) (0.00377) 
     
L.Killings (origin) 0.00328 0.000526 -0.00186 -0.00426 
 (0.00439) (0.00365) (0.00367) (0.00458) 
     
L2.Killings (origin) 0.000958 -0.00296 0.00291 0.00475 
 (0.00385) (0.00333) (0.00284) (0.00356) 
     
Killings (dest.) x Killings (origin) 0.00238** 0.00192** 0.00168 -0.000140 
 (0.000958) (0.000955) (0.00114) (0.00220) 
     
L.Killings (dest.) x L.Killings (origin) 0.000796 -0.000192 -0.00210 0.00344 
 (0.00118) (0.00104) (0.00136) (0.00228) 
     
L2.Killings (dest.) x L2.Killings (origin) -0.00191* -0.00302** 0.00162 -0.00436** 
 (0.00106) (0.000999) (0.00110) (0.00215) 
N 39865 46323 33328 29454 
r2 0.966 0.970 0.978 0.965 
Dyad-clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05. 
Control variables are included in analysis but omitted from tables.  
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Drawing on the earlier literature, I attempt to analyze the interaction of terrorism in a 
destination country and several other factors such as the uniqueness of a destination, GDP 
per capita of an origin country, and civil war intensity levels of both destination and origin 
countries. Results of this investigation is shown in following Tables 9-14. The analysis of 
the interaction between terrorism and the level of uniqueness of destination does not 
provide consistent results. Some models show positive relationship between variables while 
others do not and this prevents us from making a strong claim about Hypothesis 2. 
However, other regression results of interaction terms present some interesting findings. 
I also examine the reactions of tourists from countries that are associated with a high 
GDP per capita to terrorism. When an origin country has a good economic performance, its 
citizens show more sensitivity to terrorist threats. In other words, those tourists from 
countries with lower GDP per capita hesitate less to travel risky destinations. This result 
supports Hypothesis 3 which claims that tourists from poor countries are less responsive to 
terrorism in their destinations. 
 In addition, interactions between Attacks (dest.) and Civil War Intensity (dest.) and 
also between Killings (dest.) and Civil War Intensity (dest.) show us if the level of civil war 
intensity and terrorism together increase, it is more likely that inbound tourist flows will 
decline. This result is in line with Hypothesis 4 which assumes that terrorism creates more 
damage for tourism sector when it is accompanied by high level of civil conflict. Also it 
would be important to note that interactions between terrorism variables and the level of 
civil war intensity in an origin country have the opposite sign and they are rarely 
significant. This shows that the significant interaction between terrorism and the level of 
civil war intensity is specific to destination country. 
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Table 9: Interaction of Attacks and the Level of Uniqueness in a Destination Country 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Arrival1 Arrival2 Arrival3 Arrival4 
Heritage (destination) 0.00490** 0.000647 0.00661** 0.00345** 
 (0.000847) (0.00105) (0.000882) (0.00169) 
     
Terrorist Attacks (destination) -0.00482* -0.00363 -0.00567** -0.00193 
 (0.00252) (0.00235) (0.00284) (0.00548) 
     
Attack (dest.) x Heritage (dest.) -0.000906** 0.000327 -0.000674** 0.00103** 
 (0.000326) (0.000263) (0.000231) (0.000440) 
N 41168 47707 34663 30370 
r2 0.966 0.970 0.977 0.966 
Dyad-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 
Control variables are included in analysis but omitted from tables. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Interaction of Killings and the Level of Uniqueness in a Destination Country 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Arrival1 Arrival2 Arrival3 Arrival4 
Heritage (destination) 0.00282** 0.000611 0.00572** 0.00650** 
 (0.000519) (0.000694) (0.000905) (0.00120) 
     
Killings (destination) -0.00651** -0.00646** -0.00866** -0.00178 
 (0.00201) (0.00211) (0.00247) (0.00506) 
     
Killings (dest.) x Heritage (dest.) 0.00149** 0.000772** -0.000259 0.000424 
 (0.000292) (0.000173) (0.000183) (0.000374) 
N 41168 47707 34663 30370 
r2 0.966 0.970 0.977 0.966 
Dyad-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 
Control variables are included in analysis but omitted from tables. 
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Table 11: Interaction of Attacks in a Destination with the GDP of an Origin Country 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Arrival1 Arrival2 Arrival3 Arrival4 
GDP per capita (origin) 0.0666** 0.0587** 0.0366** 0.0687** 
 (0.00413) (0.00366) (0.00299) (0.00496) 
     
Terrorist Attacks (destination) 0.0227** 0.000356 0.0118 0.0508** 
 (0.00776) (0.00807) (0.00851) (0.0177) 
     
Attack (dest.) x GDP (origin) -0.00336** -0.000304 -0.00246** -0.00544** 
 (0.000808) (0.000859) (0.000917) (0.00193) 
N 41168 47707 34663 30370 
r2 0.966 0.970 0.977 0.966 
Dyad-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 
Control variables are included in analysis but omitted from tables. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Interaction of Killings in a Destination with the GDP of an Origin Country 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Arrival1 Arrival2 Arrival3 Arrival4 
GDP per capita (origin) 0.0660** 0.0602** 0.0362** 0.0675** 
 (0.00405) (0.00362) (0.00294) (0.00490) 
     
Killings (destination) 0.0227** 0.0110 0.00770 0.0527** 
 (0.00681) (0.00750) (0.00700) (0.0190) 
     
Killings(dest.) x GDP (origin) -0.00306** -0.00157** -0.00204** -0.00603** 
 (0.000709) (0.000796) (0.000748) (0.00206) 
N 41168 47707 34663 30370 
r2 0.966 0.970 0.977 0.966 
Dyad-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 
Control variables are included in analysis but omitted from tables. 
 
32 
Table 13: Interactions of Attacks in a Destination with the Civil War Intensity Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Arrival1 Arrival2 Arrival3 Arrival4 
Terrorist Attacks (destination) -0.00645** 0.0282** -0.00431 0.00715 
 (0.00311) (0.00273) (0.00288) (0.00436) 
     
Civil War Intensity (destination) 0.0830** 0.122** -0.0260 -0.0517* 
 (0.0151) (0.0141) (0.0183) (0.0290) 
     
Civil War Intensity (origin) -0.00479 -0.0254** -0.00379 -0.00851 
 (0.00919) (0.00808) (0.00754) (0.00866) 
     
Attack (dest.) x Civil War (dest.) -0.0152** -0.0522** -0.00206 -0.00803 
 (0.00337) (0.00383) (0.00466) (0.00646) 
     
Attack (dest.) x Civil War (origin) 0.00375 0.00499* 0.00398 -0.00224 
 (0.00294) (0.00293) (0.00346) (0.00592) 
N 41168 47707 34663 30370 
r2 0.966 0.970 0.977 0.966 
Dyad-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 
Control variables are included in analysis but omitted from tables. 
 
 
 
Table 14: Interactions of Killings in a Destination with the Civil War Intensity Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Arrival1 Arrival2 Arrival3 Arrival4 
Killings (destination) -0.00418 0.0304** -0.00292 0.0104** 
 (0.00268) (0.00321) (0.00270) (0.00459) 
     
Civil War Intensity (destination) 0.0966** 0.0330** -0.000889 -0.0131 
 (0.0160) (0.0102) (0.0167) (0.0264) 
     
Civil War Intensity (origin) -0.00676 -0.0269** -0.00358 -0.0132* 
 (0.00850) (0.00749) (0.00700) (0.00777) 
     
Killings (dest.) x Civil War (dest.) -0.0158** -0.0310** -0.00704** -0.0341** 
 (0.00299) (0.00270) (0.00355) (0.00797) 
     
Killings (dest.) x Civil War (origin) 0.00495** 0.00725** 0.00378 0.00365 
 (0.00252) (0.00269) (0.00289) (0.00640) 
N 41168 47707 34663 30370 
r2 0.966 0.970 0.977 0.966 
Dyad-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 
Control variables are included in analysis but omitted from tables. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I investigate which factors make tourists more sensitive to terrorism in 
their potential destinations. I provide empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis which 
claims that being exposed to terrorism in an origin country makes tourists less sensitive to 
terrorism in their potential destinations. I show that when terrorism and the level of civil 
war intensity in a destination together increase, tourists are more likely to hesitate to travel 
there. I also show that tourists from richer countries are more sensitive to terrorist attacks. 
I am aware the limitations of my divided dependent variable which makes the sample 
size of this thesis smaller. So that my results are not distorted by countries’ diverse 
measurements of tourist arrivals, I run different regression analysis for each most common 
dependent variable (annual tourist arrivals). This limitation weakens the power of my 
analysis. Also it would be important to note that my results are not always consistent for 
different measurements of terrorism: the number of terrorist attacks, the number of 
terrorism-related deaths, target severity or attack severity. 
Another limitation of this study is the fact that some people cross borders as a tourist 
but they overstay even if their legal visas expire. In 2015, in the U.S. where visa 
requirements and controls are relatively strict, approximately 500,000 of more than 40 
million visitors did not go back to their homelands.9 It is estimated that 40 percent of the 
nearly 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. crossed borders legally with usually a 
tourist or business visa.10 Moreover, according to Mosneaga’s report (2013:2) “Moldovan 
labour migrants seek to minimize the risks of illegal migration and prefer legal methods of 
                                                          
9 https://www.cfr.org/blog-post/visa-overstays-and-illegal-immigration-finally-some-real-numbers 
10 http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2015/sep/08/jorge-ramos/ramos-40-undocumented-immigrants-come-
air/ 
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entry into the country of destination in the EU. Using tourism in the disguise, they provide 
means of legal entry into the EU for further illegal stay and illegal employment in the host 
country.” The reactions of people who seek for immigration might be different than those 
who travel for enjoyment.  
The policy implication of this study posits that if the contribution of tourism sector to 
overall economic growth of a country is high, that country needs to realize the negative 
effect of terrorism. Policy makers and tourism sector representatives should also take this 
negative effect into account while forecasting potential tourist volume and setting the 
agenda for next tourism seasons. Moreover, my findings reveal that tourists of different 
nationalities are not homogenous in terms of their decision-making process and reactions to 
terrorism. Therefore, after terrorist attacks, policy makers should consider their tourism 
volume with different countries and specify their prioritized countries as tourism partners. 
Then they can forecast possible tourist loss more effectively and plan recovery strategies 
according to the characteristics of tourist-sender countries. 
Finally, with regard to future research, it would be interesting to see if tourists are 
more sensitive to terrorist attacks which tourists and tourist places are targeted because the 
literature has the lack of consensus on this relationship. Some scholars claim that tourists 
feel higher risk when terrorists target tourists, tourist locations, or modes of transportation 
(Sandler & Enders, 2008) while others assert that tourism sector is negatively affected by 
political violence even when tourists are not directly targeted (Sönmez, 1998). In addition, 
terrorist incidents in urban areas exceed those in rural areas (Drakos & Kutan, 2003). It 
would be an important contribution to the literature to analyze the effect of geographic 
location of attacks on tourists’ choice on their travel destinations with a comprehensive 
cross-country dataset.  
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